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I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 24, 2004, the United States Supreme Court created
uncertainty and confusion in the criminal justice system regarding
sentencing at both the state and federal levels with the decision of
1
Blakely v. Washington.
Suddenly, doubt was cast on the
constitutionality and continued validity of sentencing guidelines in
2
state and federal court systems that utilized guidelines. However,
the Supreme Court was clear on several issues. First, determinate
3
sentencing structures themselves are not unconstitutional.
4
Second, sentencing guidelines are also not per se unconstitutional.
Third, enhanced sentences and plea agreements are constitutional
when certain procedures are in place to ensure the defendants’
5
constitutional rights.
While the decision of Blakely v. Washington does not directly
impact the constitutionality or the structure of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines, it does affect certain sentencing procedures
pertaining to aggravated departures and specific sentence
6
enhancements. State v. Shattuck and State v. Houston are examples
of decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court that leave the door
open for possible constitutional attacks on certain enhancing
statutes while at the same time determining that the Minnesota
7
Sentencing Guidelines are constitutional.
After discussing the facts and decisions of Shattuck and
Houston, this Article gives background information on the
8
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. It then gives background on
the landmark cases of Blakely v. Washington and its predecessor,
9
Apprendi v. New Jersey. Next, it discusses the impact these decisions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

542 U.S. 296 (2004).
See id.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Parts II, IV.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.B, III.C.
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10

have had on other states with presumptive sentencing guidelines.
Finally, this Article addresses how the Shattuck and Houston
decisions will impact the criminal justice system in Minnesota state
11
courts.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASES
A. State v. Shattuck
1.

Facts

Robert Shattuck was arrested for the suspected rape of
12
R.E. was walking
seventeen-year-old R.E. on January 30, 2001.
home after getting off a bus in south Minneapolis, when a man
pushing a bicycle approached her from behind, threatened her,
and forced her to walk down an alley and then proceeded to
13
sexually assault her. Shattuck was quickly held to be the main
14
suspect in the case. Shattuck subsequently fled to Georgia after
his picture was shown on television in connection with the crime;
15
he was arrested there on an unrelated offense. At trial, the State
introduced substantial circumstantial evidence, as well as DNA
16
evidence linking Shattuck to the crime.
2.

The District Court

During the jury instruction conference, Shattuck argued that,
17
under Apprendi v. New Jersey, any aggravating factor that could
render an enhanced sentence under the Minnesota repeat sex
18
The court
offender statute needed to be decided by the jury.
10. See discussion infra Part III.D.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Minn. 2005).
13. Id. The man took twenty-five dollars from R.E.’s wallet before he
penetrated R.E vaginally with his fingers and penis causing her pain. Id. When
R.E. asked him to stop, the man threatened her again and continued. Id. After
the man was finished, he punched R.E. in the face, breaking her jaw. Id. The man
told R.E. that if she told anybody he would kill her. Id.
14. Id. Shattuck worked at a nearby restaurant and had gotten off work
shortly before the assault. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi is discussed in detail infra Part III.B.
18. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 134.
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denied this request and Shattuck was subsequently found guilty of
two counts of kidnapping, two counts of first-degree criminal
19
sexual conduct, and one count of first-degree aggravated robbery.
When Shattuck committed the offense, first-degree criminal
sexual conduct and kidnapping with great bodily harm were both
Severity Level Eight offenses under the Minnesota Sentencing
20
Guidelines. The presumptive guideline sentence was a range of
21
156 to 166 months with Shattuck’s criminal history score of nine.
The trial court sentenced Shattuck to the presumptive 161-month
sentence for the kidnapping as well as an enhanced sentence of a
360-month term for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct
22
pursuant to Minnesota’s repeat sex offender statute, due to four
23
aggravating factors being present in the crime.
3.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Shattuck’s sentence,
stating that the trial court “acted within its discretion in finding
that aggravating factors provided a sufficient basis for sentencing
Shattuck under a mandatory-minimum-sentencing statute, and that
24
decision did not violate the holding of Apprendi.” The court based
25
its argument on State v. McCoy, which held that Apprendi applies
only to situations in which a court sentences a defendant to a term
26
that exceeds the statutory maximum. Blakely was then decided
27
while Shattuck’s petition for review was pending.

19. Id.
20. Id. See infra Part III.A. for a discussion of the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines.
21. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 134.
22. The repeat sex offender statute provides that for certain forms of firstand second-degree criminal sexual conduct, the district court shall commit the
defendant for no less than thirty years if it finds that (1) an aggravating factor
exists and (2) the defendant has a previous conviction for criminal sexual conduct
in the first, second, or third degrees. MINN. STAT. § 609.109, subd. 4(a) (2004).
23. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 134-35. The court found four aggravating factors:
(1) the victim was particularly vulnerable, (2) the victim was treated with particular
cruelty, (3) the victim suffered great emotional harm, and (4) the assault was
planned. Id.
24. Id. (citing State v. Shattuck, No. 01011914, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 349,
at *19 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2004)).
25. 631 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
26. Shattuck, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 349, at *19.
27. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 135.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court

The Minnesota Supreme Court held that, based on the jury
verdict alone, Shattuck was only subject to a presumptive sentence
28
When the trial court found that aggravating
of 161 months.
factors existed in the crime, providing grounds to impose the
mandatory minimum thirty-year sentence, it violated Shattuck’s
Sixth Amendment right to have a jury make that determination
29
upon a reasonable-doubt standard. The court’s decision thereby
rendered Minnesota Statutes section 609.109, subdivision 4
30
unconstitutional in its entirety, while the unconstitutional section
of Minnesota Sentencing Guideline II.D was severable from its
31
constitutional sections.
While the Minnesota Supreme Court was deciding Shattuck,
the Minnesota Legislature acted to make sure various Minnesota
32
statutes complied with Apprendi and Blakely.
The Minnesota
Legislature amended Minnesota Statutes section 609.109,
subdivision 4 to require the factfinder, rather than the court, to
determine whether aggravating factors exist that would provide
grounds for a mandatory thirty-year sentence as a repeat sex
33
offender. The Shattuck court took note of these amendments and
34
stated that “we express no opinion about these recent changes.”

28. Id. at 142.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 142-42. Without the unconstitutional provision, the statute is
incomplete and incapable of being executed. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 645.20
(2004).
31. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 144. The court determined that Minnesota
Sentencing Guideline II.D is unconstitutional only insofar as it allows the district
court to impose an upward departure based on judicial findings. Id. The court
did not believe that the remaining provisions in the guidelines are “so essentially
and inseparably connected with, and so dependant upon” the unconstitutional
provision that without it, the remaining provisions would not have been enacted.
Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.20). This is mainly based on the Blakely decision,
which focuses on the procedure of judicial fact-finding for upward departures
rather than the substance of determinate sentencing. Id.
32. S.F. No. 2273, 84th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).
33. Id.
34. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 148 n.16.
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B. State v. Houston
1.

Facts

Gerald Houston was convicted of one count of an attempted
first-degree controlled substance crime as well as one count of a
35
fifth-degree controlled substance crime on October 10, 2001. The
presumptive guideline sentence for these crimes was eighty and
36
one-half months.
The district court departed from the
presumptive guidelines, based on the Minnesota Career Offender
37
Statute, and sentenced Houston to 270 months.
After the
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Houston’s upward departure
from the presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines, he attempted to collaterally challenge the sentence
38
through the process of postconviction review. The postconviction
court upheld Houston’s sentence; however, while his appeal of that
39
decision was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Blakely.
2.

The Minnesota Supreme Court

In State v. Houston, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined
that Blakely could be applied retroactively to cases on direct review,
40
but not to cases on collateral review. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals ruled that Houston was unable to utilize Blakely because
the case announced a new rule of constitutional criminal
procedure and Houston had exhausted all means of direct appeal
41
at the time Blakely was decided.
35. State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 269 (Minn. 2005). Houston possessed
in his motor vehicle items necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. Id.; see
MINN. STAT. §§ 152.021, subd. 2(a), 609.17, 152.025, subd. 2(1).
36. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. Houston’s sentence was based on a severity
level of eight and a criminal history score of seven. For a discussion of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, see infra Part III.A.
37. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 269-70. The trial court found that (1) Houston
had been convicted of at least five previous crimes, and (2) the current crime was
committed as “part of a pattern of criminal behavior.” Id. at 270; see MINN. STAT. §
609.1095, subd. 4.
38. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 270-71. Once a defendant has exhausted all of his remedies in state
courts, he is allowed to make constitutional challenges through the postconviction
review process. MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subd. 1. Houston held that Blakely could be
applied retroactively to a case that was pending on direct appeal, not on appeal
from a denial of postconviction relief. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 273.
41. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. Houston was denied relief on direct review
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42

Pursuant to the mandates of retroactivity jurisprudence, a
new rule does not apply once all direct appeals have been
43
exhausted. Furthermore, the court determined that Blakely does
44
not announce a “watershed” rule and is thus not subject to
45
retroactive application on collateral review. In order for a rule to
be considered watershed, it must be one without which “the
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished,” and
one that is essential to the fundamental fairness of the
46
proceeding. The court determined that a Blakely violation only
requires a remand for resentencing rather than a new trial to
47
determine the validity of the conviction. When a Blakely violation
is made, the likelihood of an accurate conviction is not seriously
48
diminished, making the rule not one of watershed magnitude.
Houston further claimed that the Apprendi line of cases
requires that all sentencing factors that increase the penalty beyond
the punishment available based solely on the jury verdict or guilty
49
plea be treated as underlying elements of the offense. Because
elements of an offense must be placed in the charging instrument,
submitted to a jury, and found beyond a reasonable doubt, treating
sentencing factors as elements implicates “bedrock procedural
by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, and denied review by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. Id. The postconviction court also upheld Houston’s sentence. Id. This
action was an appeal from the postconviction court decision. Id.
42. In Minnesota, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), is used to determine
the retroactivity of federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure. O’Meara v.
State, 679 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn. 2004). Under Teague, the court first
determines if the rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure is new.
Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. If the rule is considered new, it will be applied to all
cases pending on direct review. Id. If the defendant has exhausted all means of
direct appeal, that defendant will not be able to petition for certiorari. Id.
Teague stated that a rule of constitutional criminal procedure is new if it is
not “dictated” by precedent. 489 U.S. at 301. The test is whether “reasonable
jurists hearing petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became final ‘would
have felt compelled by existing precedent’ to rule in his favor.” Houston, 702 N.W.2d
at 271 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993)).
43. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270.
44. A rule is considered “watershed” if it “‘requires the observance of those
procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ or ‘alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the
fairness of any particular conviction.’” Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270-71 (quoting
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
45. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 273.
46. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313).
47. Id. at 274.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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elements,” which under Teague would require a new procedural
50
rule to be construed as watershed. The court, however, declined
to address this issue as it has not been explicitly addressed by the
51
U.S. Supreme Court.
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines are used to establish
rational and consistent sentencing standards, which reduce
sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following a
conviction of a felony are proportional to the severity of the offense
52
and the criminal history of the defendant. Minnesota utilizes a
determinate sentencing model that now complies with the
53
constitutional protections recognized in Blakely. One axis of the
sentencing grid lists the severity of the offense, while the other axis
54
lists the criminal history score of the defendant.
The
corresponding grid for these two points gives the sentencing judge
a determinate range that must be used, absent any aggravating
55
factors.
A departure from the guidelines is permitted if
56
aggravating or mitigating factors are found. As Blakely explained,
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § I (2004).
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF BLAKELY V.
WASHINGTON ON SENTENCING IN MINNESOTA §§ 3, 5 (2004).
54. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.A.-B. (2004).
55. Id. § II.C.-D.
56. Id. § II.D. A non-exclusive list of mitigating factors used for a departure
include:
(1) The victim was an aggressor in the incident.
(2) The offender played a minor or passive role in the crime or
participated under circumstances of coercion or duress.
(3) The offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked
substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed. The
voluntary use of intoxicants (drugs or alcohol) does not fall within the
purview of this factor.
(4) The offender’s presumptive sentence is a commitment to the
commissioner but not a mandatory minimum sentence, and either of the
following exist:
(a) The current conviction offense is at severity level I or II and
the offender received all of his or her prior felony sentences
during less than three separate court appearances; or
(b) The current conviction offense is at severity level III or IV
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it is not the aggravated departure from the guidelines that invokes
a constitutional challenge, but the method by which the aggravated
57
departure is given.
When Blakely was decided, the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines left discretion to the sentencing judge,
rather than the jury, to determine if an aggravated departure was
58
appropriate.
In Minnesota, aggravated departures accounted for
and the offender received all of his or her prior felony
sentences during one court appearance.
(5) Other substantial grounds exist which tend to excuse or mitigate the
offender’s culpability, although not amounting to a defense.
(6) Alternative placement for offender with serious and persistent mental
illness . . . .
Id. § II.D.2.a.
A non-exclusive list of aggravating factors used in an upward departure
includes
(1) The victim was particularly vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or
reduced physical or mental capacity, which was known or should have
been known to the offender.
(2) The victim was treated with particular cruelty for which the individual
offender should be held responsible.
(3) The current conviction is for a Criminal Sexual Conduct offense or
an offense in which the victim was otherwise injured and there is a prior
felony conviction for a Criminal Sexual Conduct offense or an offense in
which the victim was otherwise injured.
(4) The offense was a major economic offense, identified as an illegal act
or series of illegal acts committed by other than physical means and by
concealment or guile to obtain money or property, to avoid payment or
loss of money or property, or to obtain business or professional
advantage. . . .
(5) The offense was a major controlled substance offense, identified as
an offense or series of offenses related to trafficking in controlled
substances under circumstances more onerous than the usual offense. . . .
(6) The offender committed, for hire, a crime against the person.
(7) Offender is a “patterned sex offender” . . . .
(8) Offender is a “dangerous offender who commits a third violent
crime” . . . .
(9) Offender is a “career offender” . . . .
(10) The offender committed the crime as part of a group of three or
more persons who all actively participated in the crime.
(11) The offender intentionally selects the victim or the property against
which the offense is committed, in whole or in part, because of the
victim’s, the property owner’s or another’s actual or perceived race,
color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, age, or national origin.
(12) The offender’s use of another’s identity without authorization to
commit a crime. This aggravating factor may not be used when the use
of another’s identity is an element of the offense.
Id. § II.D.2.b.
57. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004).
58. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 53, §§ 3, 5.
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approximately 7.7% of all felony sentences in 2002 (or 1002 of
59
12,978). An aggravated departure in Minnesota can occur one of
60
61
two ways.
The first is an aggravated dispositional departure,
62
while the second is an aggravated durational departure. Out of
the approximately 1000 cases per year that involved aggravated
departures, and thus implicated Blakely issues, approximately 8%
63
(seventy-nine) of the cases involved a trial.
B. Apprendi v. New Jersey
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the defendant fired several shots into
64
the home of an African-American family. Apprendi pled guilty to
two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful
65
purpose, which carried a presumptive prison sentence of five to
66
ten years.
Although the count did not initially refer to New
67
Jersey’s hate crime statute, as part of the plea agreement the State
of New Jersey reserved the right to impose an enhanced sentence
on the ground that the crime was committed with a biased
68
purpose. In an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded by a
preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi’s actions were
69
motivated by racial bias and “with a purpose to intimidate.” The
59. Id. § 4.
60. Id.
61. Id. An aggravated dispositional departure occurs when the defendant
should have received a presumptive stayed sentence under the guidelines, but
instead the court imposed a prison sentence. Id.
62. Id. An aggravated duration departure occurs when the offender receives
a sentence length that is longer than the sentence recommended by the
sentencing grid, regardless of whether the sentence is a presumptive stay or a
presumptive prison sentence. Id.
63. Id.
64. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000).
65. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995).
66. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470; see § N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West
1995).
67. At the time New Jersey’s hate crime statute “provide[d] for an ‘extended
term’ of imprisonment if the trial judge [found], by a preponderance of the
evidence, that ‘the defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender,
handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.’” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468
(quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 2000)). The extended term
authorized for second-degree offenses is imprisonment for between ten and
twenty years. Id.
68. Id. at 470. Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the sentence
enhancement on the ground that it violated the U.S. Constitution. Id.
69. Id. at 471.
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court sentenced Apprendi to an enhanced twelve-year term of
70
imprisonment on the firearm charge. On appeal, the New Jersey
71
Supreme Court upheld Apprendi’s sentence.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme
Court in a five-to-four ruling, stating “[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
72
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Court also
stated that when the term “sentence enhancement” is used to
describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory
sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
73
offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict.
Therefore it fits as an element of the offense. The U.S. Supreme
Court concluded that Apprendi’s constitutional rights had been
74
violated. The trial court had imposed a sentence greater than the
maximum prescribed under the state law without a jury
determining additional facts beyond a reasonable doubt that would
75
warrant an upward sentencing departure.
C. Blakely v. Washington
Four years after Apprendi, the U.S. Supreme Court handed
76
In Blakely, the
down the decision of Blakely v. Washington.
defendant abducted his ex-wife at knifepoint and forced her into a
77
wooden box in the back of his pickup truck. As soon as their
thirteen-year-old son returned from school, Blakely ordered him to
70. Id.
71. Id. at 472. The court explained that due process only requires the State
to prove the “elements” of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 472. The
fact that a state legislature “has placed a criminal component ‘within the
sentencing provisions’ of the criminal code ‘does not mean that the finding of a
biased purpose to intimidate is not an essential element of the offense.’” Id.
(quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 492 (N.J. 1999)).
72. Id. at 490.
Apprendi did not render all presumptive sentences
unconstitutional.
Id. at 481.
The Court stated that there is nothing
unconstitutional about the trial court using various factors relating to the offense
and offender to impose a sentence within the range prescribed by statute. Id. A
Sixth Amendment problem occurs when the trial court makes a determination of
a fact that leads to punishment exceeding the statutory maximum the defendant
would have received based on facts reflected in the jury verdict alone. Id. at 483.
73. Id. at 494 n.19.
74. Id. at 491-92.
75. Id. at 491-97.
76. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
77. Id. at 298.
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78

follow in another car, threatening to do harm to his mother.
79
Blakely was eventually arrested in Montana. In a plea agreement,
Blakely was charged with second-degree kidnapping involving
80
domestic violence and use of a firearm.
Blakely admitted no
81
relevant facts other than the elements of the charges.
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a sentence
within the standard range of forty-nine to fifty-three months,
82
pursuant to the Washington Sentencing Guidelines.
The trial
court departed from the presumptive sentence, and imposed an
83
“exceptional” sentence of ninety months. The trial court justified
this sentence on the ground that Blakely acted with “deliberate
cruelty,” which is a statutorily enumerated ground for departure in
84
the state of Washington.
After all appeals were affirmed through the Washington
85
Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
86
While the U.S. Supreme Court applied the holding in Apprendi, it
87
further defined what was meant by the term “statutory maximum.”
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.40.030(1), 10.99.020(3)(p), 9.94A.125
(2000).
81. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299.
82. Id. at 300. State law in Washington provided that “[n]o person convicted
of a [class B] felony shall be punished by confinement . . . exceeding . . . a term of
ten years.” Id. at 299 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(1)(b) (2000)).
Furthermore, other provisions limited the range of sentences a judge may impose.
Id. The offense to which Blakely pled guilty carried a presumptive range of fortynine to fifty-three months. Id. at 300.
83. Id. “A judge may impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds
‘substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.’” Id. at 299
(quoting WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.120(2) (2000)). If a judge imposes an
exceptional sentence, he must make specific findings of fact and conclusions of
law supporting the departure. Id.
84. Id. at 299; see WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (2000). The trial
court made the following findings of fact with regard to aggravating factors:
The defendant’s methods were more homogeneous than his motive. He
used stealth and surprise, and took advantage of the victim’s isolation.
He immediately employed physical violence, restrained the victim with
tape, and threatened her with injury and death to herself and others. He
immediately coerced the victim into providing information by the
threatening application of a knife. He violated a subsisting restraining
order.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.
85. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.
86. See supra Part III.B. (explaining Apprendi’s holding).
87. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04.
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Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
88
defendant.” Therefore, the trial court could not have imposed a
ninety-month sentence based only on the facts the defendant had
89
The trial court imposed a ninetyadmitted in the guilty plea.
month sentence based on substantial and compelling aggravating
90
factors not admitted by Blakely. Because these factors were not
submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
Blakely’s sentence was rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme
91
Court.
The Court stressed that this ruling did not render
determinate sentencing schemes unconstitutional; rather Blakely
held that these sentencing schemes were unconstitutional in the
92
way they were applied.
D. Reaction from Other States with Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines
At the time the Apprendi and Blakely decisions were handed
down, Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Tennessee
all employed a sentencing system based on presumptive guidelines
93
This Part
that involved judicial fact-finding in some form.
illustrates measures these states have taken in order to comply with
Apprendi and Blakely’s Sixth Amendment interpretation.
1.

Kansas

The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines provided a range for
sentencing based on the severity level of the offense and the
94
defendant’s criminal history score. Before Apprendi and Blakely,
the State was able to move for an upward departure sentence based

88. Id. at 303. The Court further explained statutory maximum when it
stated “[i]n other words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he
may impose without any additional findings.” Id. at 303-04.
89. Id. at 304. Blakely did not admit any other relevant information besides
the elements of the offenses in the guilty plea. Id. at 299.
90. See id. at 304.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 308.
93. See infra Parts III.D.1.-4.
94. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4704 (2000). The vertical axis of the sentencing
guidelines grid is the crime severity scale while the horizontal axis is based on the
defendant’s criminal history score. § 21-4704(c). The presumptive guideline
would be found at the meeting place of these two factors. § 21-4704(e)(1).
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on a list of non-exclusive aggravating factors.
The statute
provided that if a sentencing judge found substantial and
compelling reasons based on aggravating factors present, the judge
would be able to initiate an upward departure from the sentencing
96
guidelines.
In applying Apprendi, Kansas determined that having a judge,
rather than a jury, make the findings of aggravating factors violated
97
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
The court in State v.
Gould stated that the statute was silent on any burden of proof to be
utilized by the district judge to establish a substantial and
98
compelling reason to depart from the presumptive guidelines.
Because of this, an upward departure from the sentencing
guidelines required less evidentiary weight than facts asserted for
99
conviction.
The Gould court held that the Kansas sentencing
100
scheme was unconstitutional on its face and therefore invalid.
In 2002, the Kansas Legislature amended its sentencing
101
The new legislation required that any fact that
procedures.
would increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory
maximum, other than a prior conviction, must be submitted to a
102
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
If evidence
presented warrants an increased penalty, the court will conduct a
103
separate departure sentence proceeding before a trial jury.
2.

North Carolina

In 1993, North Carolina enacted the Structured Sentencing
Act, which required sentencing judges to impose a minimum and
maximum active, intermediate, or community punishment for
104
felony convictions. Ranges for possible minimum sentences were
95. § 21-4716(c)(1).
96. § 21-4716(b)(2). An upward departure was limited by a “double-double
rule” which prohibited a sentence to exceed twice the maximum presumptive
imprisonment term of the departure sentence following aggravation. § 214720(c)(3).
97. State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001).
98. Id. at 812.
99. Id. (citing State v. Spain, 953 P.2d 1004 (Kan. 1998)).
100. Id. at 814.
101. 21 Kan. Reg. 869 (June 6, 2002).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.13 (2003). The length of term imposed
depended on the offense class, defendant’s prior record, and whether aggravating
or mitigating factors were present. State v. Allen, 615 S.E.2d 256, 261 (N.C. 2005);
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set forth on every combination of offense class and prior-record
105
The sentencing judge would consider what aggravating or
level.
mitigating circumstances existed and select an appropriate
106
punishment range.
Like Kansas, a non-exclusive list of
107
aggravating and mitigating factors was statutorily enumerated.
The State was required to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that aggravating factors existed, while the defense was
108
required to prove mitigating factors by the same standard.
Regardless, the decision to depart from the presumptive range was
109
entirely in the trial judge’s discretion.
To meet Apprendi’s requirements, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that facts supporting an enhanced sentence must be
110
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The
court further stated that “in every instance where the state seeks an
enhanced sentence pursuant to [North Carolina General Statutes
section] 15A-1340.16A, it must allege statutory factors supporting
111
the enhancement in an indictment.” Following the State v. Lucas
decision, North Carolina amended its statute so that trial judges
were no longer permitted to find facts supporting an enhanced
112
sentence.
After the Blakely decision further defined the term “statutory
maximum,” the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled its
113
decision in Lucas.
In State v. Allen, the court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial only affected the portions of the
North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act which permit a
sentencing judge to impose an aggravated sentence based on the
see also §§ 15A-1340.13, -1340.14, -1340.16, -1340.17. The minimum statutory
punishment chart displayed a grid where offense classes and prior record level
were the axes. Allen, 615 S.E.2d at 261; see also § 15A-1340.17(c). Maximum
sentences corresponded to every minimum sentence and were listed on separate
tables. Allen, 615 S.E.2d at 261; see also § 15A-1340.17(d)-(e1).
105. § 15A-1340.17(c). Ranges are presumptive, mitigated in less severe cases,
or aggravated in the worst cases. Id.
106. § 15A-1340.16(a)-(c).
107. § 15A-1340.16(d)-(e). The prosecutor and defendant were entitled to
present any evidence of other factors that were reasonably related to the purposes
of sentencing. § 15A-1340.16(d)(20), (e)(21).
108. Allen, 615 S.E.2d at 261; see also § 15A-1340.16(a).
109. Allen, 615 S.E.2d at 261; see also § 15A-1340.16(a), (b).
110. State v. Lucas, 548 S.E.2d 712, 731 (N.C. 2001), overruled by Allen, 615
S.E.2d 256.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Allen, 615 S.E.2d at 264 n.4.
113. Id. at 265.
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existence of aggravating factors not admitted by a defendant or
114
Allen determined that Blakely is not implicated
found by a jury.
when a judge determines the presence of mitigating factors or
115
when a judge balances aggravating and mitigating factors. These
determinations do not affect the statutorily defined maximum
116
sentence as explained in Blakely.
3.

Oregon

Like North Carolina, “Oregon law provide[d] that ‘the
sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive sentence . . . unless
the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose a
117
departure.’” Prior to Apprendi and Blakely, an erroneous sentence
was one that exceeded the presumptive guidelines without the
118
sentencing judge making the required additional findings.
Therefore, if a defendant was sentenced to thirty-six months when
the presumptive guidelines called for eighteen months, that
sentence was erroneous only if the sentencing judge did not make
119
any findings explaining the departure.
The Oregon Supreme
Court realized that this was the exact problem that Blakely was
120
Instead of ruling the Oregon sentencing
trying to remedy.
guidelines unconstitutional, the Oregon Supreme Court stated that
121
the guidelines were applied in an unconstitutional way.
The
court left it to the state legislature to determine what the best
122
course of action would be.
Oregon currently has legislation pending that will amend the
123
The
unconstitutional portions of the sentencing statutes.
pending amendments allow the court to impose a sentence outside
the presumptive sentence or range if the court “determines, in the
exercise of the court’s discretion, that a different sentence is more
124
appropriate.”
Furthermore, the guidelines adopted under
114. Id. at 266.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. State v. Dilts, 103 P.3d 95, 99 (Or. 2004) (quoting OR. ADMIN. R. 213-0080001 (1996)) (emphasis omitted). The presumptive guidelines were determined
by Oregon Revised Statutes section 137.669 (2004).
118. Dilts, 103 P.3d at 99.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 100.
122. See id.
123. 2005 Oregon H.B. No. 2975, 73rd Leg. Ass. (Or. 2005).
124. Id.
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section 137.667 are now advisory rather than mandatory.
4.

1279
125

Tennessee
126

In State v. Gomez, the Tennessee Supreme Court determined
that the Apprendi and Blakely decisions did not affect the state’s
127
sentencing scheme.
Under the Tennessee Sentencing Reform
Act, the trial court has discretion to select an appropriate sentence
128
The sentencing judge,
within a predetermined statutory range.
however, has no authority to impose a sentence outside this
129
statutory range.
There is no provision in the Tennessee
Sentencing Reform Act that mandates an increase in a defendant’s
130
sentence upon the judicial finding of an enhancement factor. If
a trial court determines that there are aggravating factors present,
the trial court “may set the sentence above the minimum but still
131
within the appropriate range.”
The Tennessee Supreme Court stated that although the
sentencing guidelines contain mandatory language, that language
loses its mandatory effect because the statute directs the judge to
132
enhance and mitigate within the range given.
Because the
Tennessee Sentencing Reform Act authorizes a discretionary, nonmandatory sentencing procedure rather than a formula, grid, or
other mechanical, mandatory procedure, it does not violate a
133
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
125. Id.
126. 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005).
127. Id. at 661. The Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (1)
divides felonies into five classifications according to the seriousness of the offense,
(2) separates offenders into five classifications according to the number of prior
convictions, (3) assigns a range of years for each class of crime committed by each
class of offenders, and (4) uses the enhancement and mitigating factors to assess
the definite sentence within each range. Id. at 658; see also TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4035-105 to -114 (2003).
128. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d at 659.
129. Id.
130. Id. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210 provides that the
presumptive sentence for a Class B, C, D, and E felony shall be the minimum
sentence in the range if there are no enhancement or mitigating factors. Id. The
presumptive sentence for a class A felony shall be the midpoint of the range if
there are no enhancement or mitigating factors. Id.
131. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-210 Sentencing Commission Comments (2003).
A sentencing judge must start at the minimum sentence in that range, enhance
the sentence within that range as appropriate for the enhancement factors, then
reduce the sentence within that range as appropriate for mitigating factors. Id.
132. See Gomez, 163 S.W.3d at 660.
133. Id. at 661.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Will Shattuck Present an Ex Post Facto Problem?
Shattuck rendered Minnesota Statutes section 609.109,
subdivision 4 unconstitutional in its entirety, because it could not
134
While Shattuck was
be applied without a sentencing provision.
pending, the Minnesota Legislature amended the unconstitutional
135
Because
provisions in statutes that required judicial factfinding.
the Shattuck court did not express an opinion on how Shattuck
136
could be sentenced upon remand, it left open a possible defense
for Shattuck: that the State is applying laws ex post facto to
Shattuck and others similarly situated.
Article I, section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits a State
137
from passing any ex post facto law.
An ex post facto law is any
statute which punishes as a crime an act that was innocent when
done; makes a punishment more burdensome; or which deprives
one charged with a crime of any defense available according to law
138
when the act was committed.
The bar against ex post facto laws
protects a citizen against a previously committed act being charged
as a crime, when that act was considered innocent conduct at the
139
time of commission. The bar also prevents oppressive legislation,
but at the same time does not handicap legislative control of
remedies and procedural laws which do not affect citizens
140
substantively. A procedural change in the law is not ex post facto,
regardless of the fact that it may be disadvantageous to the
141
defendant.
1.

Procedural Versus Substantive: Dobbert v. Florida

In Dobbert v. Florida, the defendant was sentenced under a
statute which provided that a person convicted of a capital felony
134. See supra Part II.A.4.
135. See supra Part II.A.4.
136. See State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 148 n.16 (Minn. 2005).
137. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977). Article I, section 11 of the
Minnesota Constitution also prohibits the passage of ex post facto laws.
138. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-170 (1925).
139. See Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 292-93.
140. Id. at 293.
141. Id.; see Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (change in statute was not ex
post facto when it merely altered who could and could not be called as witnesses in
trials, even though the change was disadvantageous to the defendant in the case).
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was to be punished by death unless the jury verdict included a
142
recommendation of mercy by a majority of the jury. If mercy was
143
found, the defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment.
The Florida Supreme Court had previously ruled that the 1971
Florida death penalty statutes were unconstitutional based on the
144
U.S. Supreme Court case of Furman v. Georgia.
Florida then
enacted a new death penalty procedure in which a jury renders an
advisory decision on punishment, not binding on the court, based
upon aggravating and mitigating circumstances relevant to the
145
case.
If the sentencing court imposes a sentence of death, a
written finding must be made illustrating the aggravating and
146
mitigating circumstances considered by the judge.
All death
sentences are also subject to an automatic priority review by the
147
Florida Supreme Court.
Dobbert first argued that the change in the role of the judge
and jury in the death penalty statute between the time of his crime
and conviction deprived him of a substantive right to have a jury
determine whether or not the death penalty should be imposed,
148
thus constituting an ex post facto violation.
Dobbert’s second
claim was that because the 1971 death penalty statute was rendered
unconstitutional, there was no death penalty in effect at the time
149
he committed his crime.
The Supreme Court denied Dobbert’s first claim, stating that
150
the change in the death penalty law was clearly procedural. The
Court reasoned that the new statute altered how the death penalty
was going to be imposed, not the degree of proof necessary to
151
establish his guilt.
Speculation that the jury would have
152
Furthermore, the Court
recommended life was unpersuasive.
reasoned that the new statute actually offers more protection for
153
defendants, not less. The death penalty was presumed under the
142. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 288 n.3.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 288 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Donaldson v.
Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972)).
145. Id. at 289.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 292.
149. Id. at 297.
150. Id. at 293.
151. See id. at 294.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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old statute, only to be overruled by a majority of the jury
154
recommending mercy. The new Florida statute required a judge
to impose the death penalty only after making a written finding
indicating insufficient mitigating factors necessary to outweigh
155
aggravating ones.
Even after findings are made, the decision is
156
still subject to review by the Florida Supreme Court. Viewing the
statutory changes in their totality, the Court determined that the
amendments were procedural, and also offered the defendant
157
more significant safeguards, and therefore were not ex post facto.
158
The
Dobbert’s second claim was also denied by the Court.
Court determined that “[t]he actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact
159
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.”
The existence of a capital punishment statute served as an
“operative fact” to warn the defendants of a penalty which will be
160
imposed if a capital crime is committed. This satisfies the ex post
161
facto provision of the U.S. Constitution.
2.

Dobbert Applied to Shattuck

Shattuck, and others similarly situated, could make the same
arguments that Dobbert presented to the U.S. Supreme Court by
challenging that Minnesota is applying either a substantive change
in law that makes his defense more burdensome, or that there was
no constitutionally valid Career Sex Offender Statute. If a
challenge is made, the Minnesota Supreme Court will have to
determine whether requiring a jury, rather than a trial court, to
make factual findings regarding aggravated departures is a
procedural or substantive change. If the court finds the change
procedural rather than substantive, no ex post argument can be
made.
As displayed in Dobbert, a change in the sentencing process
does not change the facts required to find guilt. The same amount
of proof will be necessary to determine if a defendant is guilty of
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 295.
157. Id. at 294-97.
158. Id. at 298.
159. Id. (quoting Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.
371, 374 (1940)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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the underlying crime. In Shattuck’s case, the court found four
aggravating factors: (1) the victim was particularly vulnerable, (2)
the victim was treated with particular cruelty, (3) the victim
162
suffered great emotional harm, and (4) the assault was planned.
These factors do not determine if Shattuck was guilty of either firstdegree criminal sexual conduct or kidnapping with great bodily
163
harm. Furthermore, the change in the statute does not alter the
aggravating factors required to impose Minnesota’s Career Sex
Offender Statute, the amendment just changes how the statute will
164
be imposed.
Much like the statute amendment in Dobbert, the amendment
to the Minnesota Career Sex Offender statute will afford more
165
protection to defendants rather than less.
Statutes are
invalidated by the Apprendi and Blakely decisions because they do
not offer sufficient protection under the Sixth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. Before the Minnesota Legislature amended the
Career Sex Offender Statute, the trial court had to find that
166
aggravating factors were more likely than not.
Changes in
violating statutes require that aggravating factors offered by the
prosecution be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable
167
doubt.
This stricter burden of proof offers more protection to
defendants, not less.
The Minnesota Supreme Court will likely follow Dobbert and
rule that the amendments made by the Minnesota Legislature,
which now require a jury rather than a trial court to determine the
presence of aggravating factors, are procedural. The amendments
do not change the requirements needed to convict for the
underlying offense, while providing the defendant more protection
under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
B. Does Houston Change the Bedrock Procedural Elements of Criminal
Procedure?
Houston further claimed that the Apprendi line of cases
requires that all sentencing factors that increase the penalty beyond
the punishment available based solely on the jury verdict or guilty
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 134-35 (Minn. 2005).
See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342, .25 (2004).
See S.F. No. 2273, 84th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).
See id.
See MINN. STAT. § 609.109.
See S.F. No. 2273, 84th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).
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168

plea must be treated as underlying elements of the offense.
Houston argued that because elements of an offense must be
placed in the charging instrument, submitted to a jury, and found
beyond a reasonable doubt, treating sentencing factors as elements
implicates “bedrock procedural elements” required by Teague to
construe a new procedural rule as watershed, mandating full
169
retroactive effect.
The court, however, declined to address this
issue as it has not been explicitly addressed by the U.S. Supreme
170
Court.
1.

Retroactivity and Bedrock Procedural Elements

Recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals determined the
171
172
retroactivity of State v. Modtland in Erickson v. State.
Modtland
had changed the three-step probation revocation rule, known as
173
the Austin factors. In order to revoke probation the court had to
(1) designate the specific condition that was violated, (2) find the
violation was intentional or inexcusable, and (3) find that the need
174
for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.
Erickson appealed his probation revocation because the trial court
175
Before Modtland, the
did not expressly make Austin findings.
courts applied a “sufficient evidence exception” when courts did
176
not make express findings on the Austin factors. If the court did
not make Austin findings, it would not be considered an abuse of
discretion if the record contained “sufficient evidence” to warrant
177
the revocation.
Modtland eliminated the sufficient evidence
exception, thus requiring the trial court to determine the three
178
Austin factors on the record before probation can be revoked.
Modtland was not released at the time the trial court in Erickson
revoked Erickson’s probation without making express Austin
179
findings.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2005).
Id.
Id.
695 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 2005).
702 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 895-96.
State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980).
Erickson, 702 N.W.2d at 895.
Id. at 895-896.
State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
Erickson, 702 N.W.2d at 896.
Id.
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not believe that the rule
expressed in Modtland altered the bedrock procedural elements
180
exception required by Teague to apply the case retroactively. The
court stated that “[t]he Modtland rule merely requires the district
181
This does not
court to place the Austin findings on the record.”
change the discretion allowed to the district court in weighing
factors or making the ultimate decision of revoking or continuing
182
the defendant’s probation.
Because it does not require
procedures that implicate the fundamental fairness of a trial, the
183
Modtland rule was not applied retroactively.
2.

Applying Erickson to Houston

In order for Blakely to apply to Houston, Blakely must change
the bedrock procedural elements of criminal procedure. Because
of Apprendi and Blakely, aggravating factors found in a crime must
be placed in the charge if they are to be presented for an upward
departure. Placing these factors as elements in the initial charge is
dissimilar to the Erickson case requiring courts to place Austin
findings on the record to determine probation revocation.
Apprendi stated that a sentence enhancement describes any
increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence for a
184
given crime.
A sentence enhancement is the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense because it gives a
defendant notice that he or she may be given a greater punishment
based on aggravating element(s). The court in Erickson stated that
the Austin factors placed in the record do not alter the discretion
courts have in determining that probation should or should not be
185
revoked.
Conversely, placing aggravating factors in the initial
charge as required by the Apprendi cases does change the
determination of what offense a defendant may be charged with.
Depending on the aggravating factors in a case, a defendant
may be charged as a career offender, resulting in a much longer
186
sentence in the state of Minnesota.
If these elements are not
presented in the charge, because of Apprendi and Blakely, a
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 897.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
Erickson, 702 N.W.2d at 897.
See MINN. STAT. § 609.109 (2004).
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defendant cannot be charged with the upward departure. This
requirement could be viewed by Minnesota courts as a bedrock
procedural change affecting the fundamental fairness of a trial,
allowing defendants to use Apprendi and Blakely on collateral review.
Aggravating factors, however, are not necessary to alter the
guilt or innocence of a defendant for the underlying offense. For
example, elements required to convict a defendant for first-degree
criminal sexual conduct are not based upon whether or not the
187
victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable. Furthermore, a
career sex offender provision cannot be applied unless there is an
188
Thus, Houston is similar to
underlying criminal sexual offense.
Erickson if a court focuses solely on the underlying crime rather
than a judge’s ability to find aggravating factors that enhance a
sentence. Aggravating factors do not alter the discretion a court
has in making the ultimate decision of a defendant’s guilt and
therefore do not implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial.
V. CONCLUSION
It is very apparent that Apprendi and Blakely have changed
criminal sentencing in this country. Each state that employs
presumptive sentencing guidelines will eventually determine the
magnitude of that change. The Minnesota courts have been a
leader in combating sentencing confusion in defining what
Apprendi and Blakely mean to their presumptive guidelines. The
recent decisions of Shattuck and Houston may muddy the waters that
the Minnesota Supreme Court has attempted to clear. These
decisions raise issues of ex post facto legislation, which Minnesota
Statutes section 609.109 likely is not, and retroactive application of
Apprendi and Blakely to cases on collateral review, which is a much
closer question.

187.
188.

See id. § 609.342.
See id. § 609.109.
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